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APPLICATION TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200, amici curiae
ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of San Diego & Imperial
Counties, ACLU of Southern California, Avvo, California AntiSLAPP Project, Electronic Frontier Foundation, First Amendment
Coalition, and Public Participation Project respectfully request
permission to file the accompanying amici curiae brief in support of
appellant Yelp Inc. 1
The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California
(ACLU-NC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan civil liberties organization
with more than 150,000 members dedicated to the principles of
liberty and equality embodied in both the United States and
California Constitutions. For more than 75 years, the ACLU-NC
has worked to protect the free speech and due process rights of
Californians through litigation and other advocacy.
The American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial
Counties (ACLU-SDIC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan civil liberties
organization with approximately 16,000 members dedicated to the
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms under the United
No party or counsel for any party authored this brief,
participated in its drafting, or made any monetary contributions
intended to fund the preparation or submission of the proposed
brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(c)(3).) Amici certify that
no person or entity other than amici and their counsel authored or
made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of the proposed brief.
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States and California Constitutions. ACLU-SDIC has regularly
appeared in this Court and other California courts in defense of
freedom of speech and due process.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California
(ACLU So Cal) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan civil liberties
organization with more than 100,000 members. Founded by Upton
Sinclair in 1923 after he was arrested for reading the Bill of Rights
at a rally in support of striking workers, ACLU So Cal has regularly
appeared as a party or amicus, or represented parties, in cases in
this Court to advance the free speech and due process rights of
Californians.
Avvo is an online legal service marketplace that provides
attorney referrals and a database of legal information, including a
searchable collection of 10 million legal questions and answers by
attorneys. One of Avvo’s integral features is attorney ratings. Its
attorney directory includes ratings of lawyers in all 50 states and
the District of Columbia, comprising about 97 percent of all
registered attorneys in the United States. Although many plaintiffs
have filed lawsuits against Avvo based on its attorney ratings,
courts have protected Avvo’s rating system under the First
Amendment. If the Court of Appeal’s decision is affirmed, Avvo
may be exposed to new legal threats despite the protection of the
First Amendment.
The California Anti-SLAPP Project (CASP) is a public interest
law firm and policy organization dedicated to fighting SLAPPs in
California. It also operates a website dedicated to educating the
legal profession and the public on SLAPP issues. CASP led the

2

statewide coalition that secured the enactment and amendment of
California’s anti-SLAPP laws, and has continued its legislative
advocacy. In particular, CASP co-sponsored influential legislation
facilitating SLAPPback suits and protecting the rights of Internet
speakers. CASP also represented the prevailing defendant in
Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33 (Barrett), in which this
Court reaffirmed the broad immunity conferred by 47 U.S.C. § 230
(section 230). The lower court’s decision here jeopardizes CASP’s
efforts in ensuring free speech in California and on the Internet.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a nonprofit,
member-supported civil liberties organization with roughly 36,000
active donors and dues-paying members nationwide, working to
protect consumer interests, innovation, and free expression in the
digital world.

EFF is particularly interested in the First

Amendment rights of Internet users and views the protections
provided by the First Amendment as vital to the promotion of a
democratic society.
The First Amendment Coalition (FAC) is a nonprofit advocacy
organization based in San Rafael, California, which is dedicated to
freedom of speech and government transparency and accountability.
FAC’s members include news media outlets, both national and
California-based, traditional media and digital, together with law
firms, journalists, community activists, and ordinary citizens.
The Public Participation Project (PPP) is a nonprofit
organization working to pass federal anti-SLAPP legislation in
Congress. Its coalition of supporters currently includes numerous
organizations and businesses, as well as prominent individuals,
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each of whom is dedicated to protecting the right of free speech and
petition. PPP also assists individuals and organizations working to
pass anti-SLAPP legislation in the states. An important part of its
work includes educating the public regarding SLAPPs and the
consequences of these types of destructive lawsuits. As part of its
nationwide educational efforts, the PPP seeks to advance generally
the principles of free speech and petition as embodied in the First
Amendment. The Court of Appeal’s opinion here threatens those
principles for the reasons expressed in the body of this amici brief.
The accompanying amici curiae brief by ACLU-NC, ACLUSDIC, ACLU So Cal, Avvo, CASP, EFF, FAC, and PPP argues that
the injunction issued against Yelp violates the First Amendment as
an unconstitutional prior restraint, violates Yelp’s due process
rights by enforcing an injunction against a nonparty, and violates
section 230 by treating Yelp as the publisher of user-created
content. Amici believe this Court would benefit from additional
briefing on these issues. Accordingly, amici request that this Court
accept and file the attached amici curiae brief.

4

April 14, 2017

HORVITZ & LEVY LLP

JEREMY B. ROSEN
SCOTT P. DIXLER
MATTHEW C. SAMET

By:

441~±~ C
Matthew C. Samet

Attorneys for Amici Curiae
ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,
ACLU OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL
COUNTIES, ACLU OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA, AVVO, CALIFORNIA
ANTI-SLAPP PROJECT, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION,
FIRST
AMENDMENT
COALITION,
AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT

AMICI CURIAE BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment generally prohibits prior restraints on
even

allegedly

actionable

speech

because

they

suppress

communication before an adequate judicial determination can be
made that the challenged speech lacks constitutional protection.
Due process also generally bars courts from issuing injunctions
against nonparties to lawsuits because they have not had the
opportunity to defend themselves.

Similarly, 47 U.S.C. § 230

broadly immunizes interactive computer services from lawsuits
challenging postings made by third parties using their platforms.
Without such immunity, interactive computer services would
effectively be required to remove any third-party content upon a
mere claim that it is defamatory, thereby inevitably removing
protected speech from the marketplace of ideas. This statutory
protection, coupled with the First Amendment and general notions
of due process, has permitted the Internet to flourish as the greatest
information platform in the history of our civilization.
Here, the Court of Appeal approved a prior restraint—
specifically, an injunction ordering nonparty Yelp to remove thirdparty content from its website—with only minimal substantive
consideration, let alone a full trial on the merits to determine
whether the challenged speech was in fact defamatory, as required
by the First Amendment. In doing so, the Court of Appeal ignored
not only long-established precedent prohibiting such prior

6

restraints, but also precedent barring the issuance of injunctions
against nonparties and providing immunity to interactive computer
services under section 230 in similar circumstances. This error was
particularly egregious in the context of this case, where Yelp was
also denied the protections that are afforded by a full and complete
trial, and the challenged judgment resulted from cursory default
judgment procedures. Furthermore, the injunction violated Yelp’s
due process rights because no court made a judicial determination
that Yelp had aided or abetted Bird.
In short, the injunction was riddled with deficiencies,
violating the First Amendment, due process, and section 230. By
allowing this improper injunction to stand, the Court of Appeal’s
opinion opens the Internet to a new wave of litigation that
threatens its continued existence.
This Court should reverse the decision below and direct the
trial court to grant Yelp’s motion to vacate the judgment. To the
extent the Court of Appeal properly interpreted this Court’s
precedent in reaching its speech-restricting conclusion, such
precedent should be overruled.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

THE INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE VIOLATES THE
FIRST AMENDMENT.

A.

Prior

restraints

on

speech

are

presumptively

unconstitutional.
Prior restraints are “ ‘administrative and judicial orders
forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the
time that such communications are to occur’ ” (Alexander v. U.S.
(1993) 509 U.S. 544, 550 [113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441],
emphasis omitted), or in advance of a “ ‘judicial determination that
specific speech is defamatory’ ” (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v.
Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1154 (Balboa Island) [“ ‘Once speech
has judicially been found libelous . . . an injunction for restraint of
continued publication of that same speech may be proper’ ”]).
The First Amendment generally prohibits prior restraints on
speech.

(Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1159.)

Prior

restraints are “the most serious and the least tolerable infringement
on First Amendment rights” because they carry an “immediate and
irreversible sanction.” (Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976) 427
U.S. 539, 559 [96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683].) “The special vice of a
prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed . . . before
an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First
Amendment.” (Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
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Human Relations (1973) 413 U.S. 376, 390 [93 S.Ct. 2553, 37
L.Ed.2d 669] (Pittsburgh Press).)
Thus, prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional.
(See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis (1994) 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 [114 S.Ct.
912, 127 L.Ed.2d 358] [“For many years it has been clearly
established that any prior restraint on expression comes to this
Court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity”
(internal quotation marks omitted)]; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan
(1963) 372 U.S. 58, 70 [83 S.Ct. 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584].)
B.

Injunctions against speech are permitted against
parties to a lawsuit only after a full and fair trial on
the merits and should not be permitted against
nonparties.
In Balboa Island, this Court recognized a limited exception to

the general rule barring speech injunctions, holding that “following
a trial at which it is determined that the defendant defamed the
plaintiff, the court may issue an injunction prohibiting the
defendant from repeating the statements determined to be
defamatory.” (Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1155-1156,
emphasis added; see also id. at p. 1148 [“an injunction issued
following a trial . . . is not a[n unconstitutional] prior restraint”]; id.
at p. 1158 [“it is crucial to distinguish requests for preventive relief
prior to trial and post-trial remedies to prevent repetition of
statements judicially determined to be defamatory”]; id. at p. 1155
[“we hold that, following a trial at which it is determined that the

9

defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court may issue an
injunction”].)
The opinion in Balboa Island extended no further than
injunctions against repeating specific speech, issued after a full trial
on the merits. 2 Indeed, the cases cited by this Court in its opinion
each involved speech “judicially determined to be unlawful” after
such a full and complete trial. (Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at
Indeed, Balboa Island departs from the traditional common
law rule that injunctions may not be issued against defamatory
speech, even after a trial. (Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams (C.D.Cal.
2012) 879 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1089-1090 [“Indeed, injunctions against
speech were not permissible in defamation cases under early
English and American common law, and the [United States]
Supreme Court has never departed from this precedent”]; Kramer
v. Thompson (3d Cir. 1991) 947 F.2d 666, 677 [“the maxim that
equity will not enjoin a libel has enjoyed nearly two centuries of
widespread acceptance at common law”].) Numerous courts have
denied prior restraints of defamatory speech on this basis. (See,
e.g., Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc. (N.D.Okla. 1993) 827 F.Supp.
674, 681 [“The fundamental law of libel in both Oklahoma and
Texas is that monetary damages are an adequate and appropriate
remedy and that injunctive relief is not available”]; New Era
Publications Intern., ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc. (S.D.N.Y.
1988) 695 F.Supp. 1493, 1525 [“we accept as black letter that an
injunction is not available to suppress defamatory speech”]; Demby
v. English (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995) 667 So.2d 350, 355 [“It is a ‘well
established rule that equity will not enjoin either an actual or a
threatened defamation’ ”]; Prucha v. Weiss (1964) 233 Md. 479, 484
[197 A.2d 253, 256] [“We agree with the prevailing concept in other
jurisdictions that a person allegedly injured by a libelous
publication has no right to seek injunctive relief in equity”]; Kwass
v. Kersey (1954) 139 W.Va. 497, 511 [81 S.E.2d 237, 245] [“equity
has no jurisdiction to enjoin publication of defamatory matter”].) If
this Court does not reconsider Balboa Island, it should certainly go
no further in approving speech-restricting injunctions than the
narrow exception recognized in Balboa Island.
2

10

pp. 1151-1153, citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown (1957) 354 U.S.
436, 437 [77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469] [upholding state law
prohibiting the sale of written material found obscene after “due
trial”], Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973) 413 U.S. 49, 55 [93
S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446] [upholding statute banning exhibition of
obscene material only after a full adversarial proceeding and a final
judicial determination by the state supreme court that the material
was unprotected], Pittsburgh Press, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 390
[holding order forbidding help-wanted advertisements in genderdesignated columns did not constitute a prior restraint on speech
because the order would not take effect until after a final
determination that the advertisements were unprotected].)
Furthermore, Balboa Island’s limited authorization of speechrestricting injunctions applies only to injunctions issued against
parties found liable at trial (in contrast to third parties with no
involvement in the trial proceedings).

The opinion carefully

permitted injunctions “issued following a trial that determined that
the defendant defamed the plaintiff that does no more than prohibit
the defendant from repeating the defamation.” (Balboa Island,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1148, emphases added; see also id. at pp.
1155-1156 [injunction after trial prohibits defendant “from
repeating the statements determined to be defamatory”].)
Indeed, this Court explicitly “express[ed] no view regarding
whether the scope of the injunction properly could be broader if
people other than [defendant] purported to act on her behalf.”
(Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1160, fn. 11.) The Court was
correct to not decide that post-judgment injunctions can be directed
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to nonparties because in “cases evaluating injunctions restricting
speech,” a “more stringent application of general First Amendment
principles” is required. (Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.
(1994) 512 U.S. 753, 765 [114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593]
(Madsen).) Considering the general First Amendment prohibition of
prior restraints of speech, Balboa Island should not be extended to
justify injunctions against nonparties after a default judgment.
C.

The injunction against Yelp is an unconstitutional
prior restraint.
The injunction in this case ordered Yelp to “ ‘remove all

reviews posted by [Bird] . . . and any subsequent comments’ ” posted
by Bird because they were supposedly defamatory. (Hassell v. Bird
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1345 (Hassell), emphasis omitted.)
However, these reviews were determined to be libelous at a default
prove-up hearing, at which Bird did not appear and Yelp did not
attend because plaintiff did not name it as a party. (See ibid.) Yet,
plaintiff then delivered the default judgment to Yelp, expecting it to
comply with the judgment. (Id. at p. 1346.) However, Yelp did not
know how the court determined that the reviews were defamatory
because Yelp was not present to assess any of the evidence or
testimony proffered by plaintiff and unchallenged by Bird. (See id.
at p. 1344.) Even today, because “a transcript of that hearing is not
in the appellate record” (ibid.), it is still unclear to Yelp, or to any
reviewing court, how the trial court determined the speech was
defamatory.
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Thus, the injunction against Yelp operates as a prior restraint
of speech. It mandates removal of speech before a trial on the
merits and without a complete and full judicial determination that
the speech is libelous. (See Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp.
1155-1156; Nunziato, The Beginning of the End of Internet Freedom
(2014) 45 Geo. J. Int’l L. 383, 387 [“prior restraints on speech [are]
restrictions on speech imposed prior to a judicial determination of
the speech’s illegality” (emphasis omitted)].)

The injunction

compels Yelp, a nonparty to the original proceeding, to remove
speech that it had no opportunity to contest at a trial on the merits
(see Balboa Island, at pp. 1148, 1155-1156, 1178, fn. 11), or even at
the default judgment stage (see pp. 14-15, post).
To the extent the injunction affects speech after its initial
utterance, this does not change the injunction’s character as a prior
restraint of speech. (Nunziato, supra, 45 Geo. J. Int’l L. at p. 401
[“prior restraints can also be imposed midstream, after initial
circulation but sometime before a judicial determination that the
speech is illegal has been made” (emphases added)].) Furthermore,
although Bird’s alleged reviews have already been posted, the act of
removing those posts is effectively a prior restraint of the
“perpetuation, or continuation of that practice.” (Aguilar v. Avis
Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 140, emphasis
added.)
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D.

A default judgment does not provide a sufficient
factual basis to justify a speech-restricting injunction.
In general, it “is the policy of the law to favor . . . a hearing on

the merits.” (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 854-855
[“appellate courts are much more disposed to affirm an order where
the result is to compel a trial upon the merits than they are when
the judgment by default is allowed to stand”]; see Fasuyi v.
Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 685 (Fasuyi); Au-Yang v.
Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958, 963.) In particular, the law “looks
with

disfavor

upon

a

party,

who,

regardless

of

the

merits . . . attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise,
inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary” by obtaining a default
judgment, which might have occurred in this case. (Weitz, at p.
855.)
To be sure, state law permits default judgments in certain
circumstances.

In appropriate cases, default judgments are

necessary to prevent a defendant from “avoid[ing] responsibility for
his actions by the irresistible expedient of ignoring the plaintiff’s
claims.” (Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 852,
865 (Carol Gilbert).) Default judgment procedures also “ ‘clear the
court’s calendar and files of those cases which have no adversarial
quality,’ ” such as those where the defendant does not respond to
the complaint. (Lopez v. Fancelli (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1305, 13091310.)
But default judgment procedures carry inherent risks. To
obtain a default judgment, a plaintiff need only prove damages at a
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prove-up hearing, which lacks key protections provided by a full
trial on the merits. (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
879, 884 (Carlsen).)

As long as the complaint’s well-pleaded

allegations adequately state a cause of action, a plaintiff is entitled
to default judgment if the plaintiff can prove damages.

(Los

Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 392.)
Otherwise, “no further proof of liability is required,” including no
requirement to introduce evidence to support the allegations in the
complaint. (Carlsen, at p. 883, citing Kim v. Westmoore Partners,
Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 281-282.) 3
Entry of default cuts off a defendant’s right to appear at a
prove-up hearing until the default is set aside or judgment is
rendered (see Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc.
(1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386), and the defendant is not
entitled to rebut the plaintiff’s proffered claims and evidence at the
hearing.

(See Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126

Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303.)

Default judgment procedure thus

“possesses the most summary, indeed perfunctory character our law
knows.” (Carol Gilbert, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 865.)

Plaintiffs claim that at a default judgment prove-up hearing, “a
plaintiff like Hassell who sues for defamation must still prove
defamation.” (ABOM 47.) Not so. So long as the complaint states a
claim for defamation, plaintiff need only prove damages from the
challenged statements. (Carlsen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 884.)
There are many situations where a plaintiff could suffer damage
from a statement but not have a cognizable defamation claim
because of the numerous constitutional and statutory requirements
necessary to prove a defamation claim.

3
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Given the risk of unfairness inherent in default judgment
procedures, “ ‘any doubts . . . must be resolved in favor of the party
seeking relief from default.’ ” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8
Cal.4th 975, 980; see Fasuyi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 685.)
Thus, only “ ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court
in setting aside the default.’ ” (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38
Cal.3d 227, 233, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973.)
This case illustrates the potential for unfairness inherent in
default judgment procedures when they interfere with a
constitutional right of a nonparty. While the Court of Appeal
merely noted that plaintiffs “served Bird by substitute service”
(Hassell, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343), plaintiffs actually
served someone in Oakland—when Bird lived in Los Angeles
according to her alleged Yelp profile—and that person “told the
process server that he had not seen Bird in months,” (OBOM 10).
Thus, it cannot be assumed that Bird ever received service of the
complaint; and even if she did, she had “no duty to act upon a
defectively served summons.” (Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier
Service (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1251.)

In view of this

questionable service, it is particularly inappropriate to rely on the
default judgment to support an injunction limiting Yelp’s
constitutional rights.
The lack of procedural protections in obtaining default
judgments also casts doubt on their reliability. (See Spector, Where
the FCRA Meets the FDCPA: The Impact of Unfair Collection
Practices on the Credit Report (2013) 20 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y
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479, 507 [“Widespread reports of unfair practices and fraud in the
procurement of those default judgments provide additional reasons
to question their reliability”].) For example, many defendants have
no idea they were sued before a default judgment is entered because
plaintiffs fraudulently serve them. (Id. at p. 490.) This problem,
suitably called “sewer service,” is so widespread that New York’s
attorney general once filed suit “to vacate thousands of default
judgments.” (Id. at p. 479, fn. 2, 490, internal quotation marks
omitted; see Rivera, Suit Claims Fraud by New York Debt Collectors
(Dec. 30, 2009) N.Y. Times <https://goo.gl/8ZAiBA>.)
Additionally, many default judgments are not obtained
against the proper defendant. (See Volokh, Dozens of Suspicious
Court Cases, with Missing Defendants, Aim at Getting Web Pages
Taken

Down

or

Deindexed

(Oct.

10,

2011)

Wash.

Post

<http://wapo.st/2dZC3nW>.) This is especially problematic in the
Internet context, where speakers can hide behind obscure
usernames and multiple identities. A plaintiff may have sued a
defendant whom the actual speaker impersonated online, or
purposely served the wrong defendant so the speaker with the real
interest in litigating the case would never receive notice to appear
in court. Thus, it is often difficult to ascertain if an injunction is
“issued against the actual author of the supposed defamation—or
against a real person at all.” (Ibid.)
In just one of many established cases of these fraudulent
lawsuits, a plaintiff filed a defamation complaint against an
individual who had no record of living at the address where the
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plaintiff allegedly served the complaint. 4

Such a situation is

notably similar to the faulty service of process in this case, which
the plaintiff allegedly completed at a house where Bird did not live
at the time, if ever at all. (See Volokh, supra, Wash. Post [“the
possibility of such shenanigans bears on the Hassell v. Bird
litigation that is now before the California Supreme Court”].)
The default judgment in this case illustrates why such
judgments are treated differently from those entered after a trial on
the merits. Plaintiffs’ dismissal of these concerns and subsequent
invocation of the right to petition (ABOM 48) is ironic because the
right to a full and fair trial on the merits is equally precious, and
plaintiffs deprived Yelp of that right by not naming it as a
defendant in the underlying lawsuit.
Given the instances of fraud and lack of procedural
protections in obtaining default judgments, Balboa Island should
not be extended beyond authorizing injunctions following full trials
on the merits. In particular, the presumption of unconstitutionality
already applied to prior restraints on speech should counsel against
interpreting Balboa Island to allow injunctions based on default
judgments. The Court of Appeal erred in extending Balboa Island
Volokh, supra, Wash. Post (“Let’s focus for now on the suit in
Rhode Island. The complaint objects to an allegedly defamatory
comment that discussed Rescue One Financial, citing two blog
posts, one of which is about Financial Rescue. But neither company
sues [the proper defendant], who might well have fought back. [¶]
Instead, a lawsuit is filed ostensibly on behalf of Bradley Smith—
the chief executive of Rescue One Financial—against one Deborah
Garcia, who supposedly lives in Rhode Island. As best we can tell,
no-one by that name lives at the address given for her.”)

4
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to approve such speech-restricting injunctions in situations where
there has not been anything resembling a full and fair trial on the
merits.
E.

The prior restraint issued here was never subjected to
the heightened First Amendment mandated review
procedures that are used even after a full trial.
As a general rule, “especially sensitive procedures” are

required when speech is at stake. (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 311 (Kash); United Farm Workers
of America v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 902, 909; see also
Carroll v. President and Com’rs of Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S.
175, 183-184 [89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325] (Carroll); Castro v.
Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 675, 690 [“Where the separation
of legitimate from illegitimate speech is concerned, the Constitution
calls for ‘sensitive tools’ ” (quoting Speiser v. Randall (1958) 357
U.S. 513, 525 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460])]; accord, Balboa
Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1159; In re Marriage of Evilsizor &
Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1430; California Retail
Liquor Dealers Institute v. United Farm Workers (1976) 57
Cal.App.3d 606, 610-611.)
Furthermore, injunctions issued without notice when service
beforehand could have been accomplished—like the injunction
here—require particularly sensitive review when First Amendment
rights are at risk. (Kash, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 311, citing Carroll,
supra, 393 U.S. at p. 180); Gluck v. County of Los Angeles (1979) 93
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Cal.App.3d 121, 135 [an ordinance “violate[d] the Kash proscription
upon ex parte orders enjoining the exercise of protected speech”].)
In Kash, this Court invalidated an ordinance that permitted seizure
and destruction of news racks without a prior hearing. (Kash, at
p. 299.) While public commissioners eventually notified news rack
owners of removal, the ordinance provided “absolutely no
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the seizure, either before
or after the removal.” (Id. at p. 306-307.) This Court found such ex
parte deprivations of protected speech without notice violated “both
procedural due process and the First Amendment.” (Id. at pp. 307,
309 [“In the face of this fundamental constitutional defect . . . the
ordinance cannot stand”].)
Plaintiffs argue that Kash and Carroll do not apply here
because “Bird’s libelous speech was adjudicated after notice and a
hearing.” (ABOM 17, fn. 6.) But Yelp did not appear at the hearing
and was not a party to the case. Because Yelp never had its day in
court before issuance of the injunction, the Court of Appeal denied
Yelp the procedural protections required by Kash. Moreover, in the
default hearing here, there was not even a full trial on the merits as
between plaintiffs and Bird to determine whether Bird’s speech was
actually defamatory or not.
Additionally, the lower court failed to follow the First
Amendment requirement that—even after a full trial on the
merits—appellate courts must carefully “ ‘make an independent
examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of
free expression.’ ” (Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.
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(1984) 466 U.S. 485, 499 [104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502], quoting
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 284-286 [84
S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686] (Sullivan); see also Evans v. Evans
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166.) Accordingly, an appellate
court’s factual review of the record in First Amendment cases is de
novo. (Bose Corp., at p. 492; Evans, at p. 1166.) This standard of
review is in stark contrast to the deference that is ordinarily
afforded to a trial court’s factual findings. (Easley v. Cromartie
(2001) 532 U.S. 234, 242 [121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430]; People
ex rel. Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
1549, 1567.)
Given this heightened review, the use of default judgment
procedures to enforce a speech-restricting injunction (with no
reporter’s transcript of the key hearing) hardly satisfies First
Amendment protection. Because even a jury’s factual findings after
a full trial are not afforded deference on appeal when First
Amendment rights are at stake, it is unconstitutional for such
rights to be curtailed by a default judgment. This Court has never
endorsed the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the kind of
injunction approved by Balboa Island (injunction issued after
complete trial on merits) can be entered after a default judgment.
And, for all of the reasons set forth above, such an injunction
entered after a default judgment is unconstitutional.
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II.

THE INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS.
The United States Supreme Court has held that due process

prohibits a court from issuing an injunction against a nonparty.
(Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. (1969) 395 U.S. 100,
109-112 [89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129] (Zenith Radio) [“ ‘It is
elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam
resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party’ ”];
see also Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd.
(1987) 484 U.S. 97, 104 [108 S.Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed.2d 415] [“ ‘The
requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows . . . from
the Due Process Clause’ ”].)
Where First Amendment rights are at stake, courts must be
particularly careful to ensure their orders are narrowly tailored.
(See Carroll, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 183 [“An order issued in the area
of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms
that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by
constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public
order”].)
Here, Yelp is in the same situation as the defendant in Zenith
Radio. Yelp had no control over Bird, the named defendant in the
underlying litigation to which Yelp was a nonparty, and Yelp had no
opportunity to participate in the underlying default judgment
proceeding. In fact, the due process violation is even more egregious
here because, unlike in Zenith Radio, there was not even a full trial
on the merits before the injunction was issued. To the contrary, the
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injunction followed a one-sided default judgment proceeding with no
appearance by Bird to defend against the allegations of defamation.
Furthermore, no court has made any judicial determination that
Yelp acted in concert with Bird. Accordingly, the injunction against
Yelp violates due process.
III.

THE INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP VIOLATES TITLE
47 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 230.

A.

The Court of Appeal improperly applied section 230 by
treating Yelp as the publisher instead of as an
interactive computer service.
Congress enacted section 230 “to further First Amendment

and e-commerce interests on the internet.” (Batzel v. Smith (9th
Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (Batzel).)

Courts across the

country—including this Court—have interpreted section 230
broadly to insulate interactive computer services from liability.
(Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 39 [“These provisions have been
widely and consistently interpreted to confer broad immunity”];
Fields v. Twitter, Inc. (N.D.Cal 2016) 200 F.Supp.3d 964, 975, citing
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327 (Zeran).)
These cases have extended immunity to claims seeking both
damages and injunctive relief. (See, e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of
Livermore (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 697-698 (Kathleen R.)
[rejecting argument that immunity does not apply to claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief], citing Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and
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Company, Inc. v. America Online Inc. (10th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3d 980,
983-986; see also 4 Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law (West
2016) Injunctive Relief and Orders Directing Interactive Computer
Services to Remove Third Party Content, § 37.05[8].) Congress
itself has explicitly endorsed this line of cases as “correctly decided.”
(Carome & Rushing, Anomaly or Trend? The Scope of § 230
Immunity Challenged by Two Courts, Comm. Law., Spring 2004, at
p. 3.)
Section 230 immunizes providers or users of an interactive
computer service, defined as “any information service . . . that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server” (47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)), from liability “as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider” (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 330
[“[section] 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would
place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role”]). There is
no dispute that Yelp is a provider, or at the very least, a user of an
interactive computer service. (See Batzel, supra, 333 F.3d at p.
1030 [“There is . . . no need here to decide whether a listserv or
website itself fits the broad statutory definition of ‘interactive
computer service,’ because . . . § 230(c)(1) confers immunity not just
on ‘providers’ . . . but also on ‘users’ of such services”].) It is likewise
undisputed that Bird is also an information content provider
because she is “responsible . . . for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet.” (47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).)
The default judgment here conflicts with section 230 because
it would treat Yelp as a publisher by casting Yelp “in the same
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position as the party who originally posted the offensive messages.”
(Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 333; PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc.
(D.S.D. 2001) 163 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1071 [“The Complaint seeks to
treat Kinko’s as a publisher . . . . [it] seeks to place Kinko’s in
Jimmy’s shoes, by holding Kinko’s responsible for alleged
defamatory matter that was published by Jimmy”].) Enforcement of
the default judgment here would therefore conflict with section 230.
(Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 831 (Gentry) [“If by
imposing liability . . . we ultimately hold eBay responsible for
content originating from other parties, we would be treating it as
the publisher . . . contrary to Congress’s expressed intent”].)
Congress explicitly granted immunity “to promote the
continued development of the Internet . . . [¶] . . . [and to] preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet.” (47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2); see also Batzel, supra, 333
F.3d at pp. 1027, 1033.) Courts and scholars have warned that
imposing liability on providers like Yelp, however, would threaten
to halt the growth of the Internet. (See, e.g., Batzel, at pp. 10271028; Letter from Twenty-Three Trade Associations, Civil Liberties
and Internet Groups, and Nineteen Law Professors to Congressional
Leaders (July 30, 2013) <http://goo.gl/539quF> (hereafter Law
Professors Letter).)
Plaintiffs claim it is somehow inconsistent for Yelp to argue it
is not the publisher of Bird’s speech for the purposes of section 230,
but to assert it has the First Amendment right to host that speech
on its website. (ABOM 3.) Plaintiffs miss the point. Yelp provides
a forum for the free speech of others, and it has an independent
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First Amendment interest in doing so. (See Sullivan, supra, 376
U.S. at pp. 257, 260 [reaffirming a newspaper’s First Amendment
rights in political advertisement created by another agency
published in that newspaper]; Pittsburgh Press, supra, 413 U.S. at
p. 386 [acknowledging a newspaper’s First Amendment rights in
help-wanted advertisements submitted by other parties]. Moreover,
section 230 merely provides that interactive computer services
should not be treated as publishers when information is provided by
another information content provider. (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).) Thus,
a website does not forfeit its First Amendment rights as a publisher
by virtue of claiming immunity under section 230.
B.

Yelp’s knowledge of an improper post does not deprive
Yelp of section 230’s protections.
Consistent with congressional intent, this Court, in line with

others, has broadly interpreted section 230 to reject the imposition
of liability on interactive computer services based on the fact that
they have notice about an allegedly improper post. (Barrett, supra,
40 Cal.4th at p. 54.) Permitting liability simply based on notice
would cause “deleterious effects” because if interactive computer
services were liable for defamatory content upon notice of such
content, they would be deterred from self-screening user content
because discovering defamatory messages would increase their
liability. (Id. at pp. 54-55.)
Under a regime in which notice yielded liability, parties who
found messages they dislike would have an easy and cost-free
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means of removing the messages simply by notifying the website,
which would likely remove the content rather than risking costly
litigation and potential liability. The result would be a profound
chilling of Internet speech. (Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 54-55.)
This chilling effect is not merely theoretical, but “obvious,” because
it would be “impossible for service providers to screen each of their
millions of postings for possible problems” and result in severe
speech restrictions. (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.) At worst,
courts have found that chilled speech would result in “shutting
down websites.” (Batzel, supra, 333 F.3d at pp. 1027-1028.)
C.

Section 230 provides important protections necessary
for a free and robust exchange of ideas on the Internet.
Absent immunity under section 230, websites hosting third-

party content would be subject to “crushing” and “crippling”
liability. (Carome & Rushing, supra, Comm. Law. at pp. 3, 8.)
Liability would be devastating because on many websites, “every
single comment by a third-party user is automatically posted,” and
comments can reach “into the millions.” (French, Picking Up the
Pieces: Finding Unity After the Communications Decency Act Section
230 Jurisprudential Clash (2012) 72 La. L.Rev. 443, 474.)
Therefore, heavily-trafficked providers could avoid liability only by
creating a “comprehensive monitoring system” that would “be
financially burdensome, unfeasible, or impossible.” (Ibid.)
Rather than absorbing such costs or passing them on to their
users, interactive computer services would likely “remove any
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system of formal notification” to avoid notice-based liability.
(French, supra, 72 La. L.Rev. at p. 475.) At worst, they would
“choose instead just to remove all content that is complained about,
without regard to its offensiveness or the resulting chilling effect on
free speech.”

(Ibid.; see Freivogel, Does the Communications

Decency Act Foster Indecency? (2011) 16 Comm. L. & Pol’y 17, 46 [“A
notice-and-takedown procedure likely would result in sites taking
down every piece of content about which a complaint is filed—
whether that content was objectionable or not”].) Congress granted
broad immunity to Internet companies to avoid these risks.
Therefore,

an

expanded

liability

regime

would

actually

“discourage[ ] services from setting up the self-regulatory regimes
that Congress wanted to encourage.” (Carome & Rushing, supra,
Comm. Law. at p. 8.)
Scholars have recognized that broad immunity “is the only
interpretation of [section] 230 that protects the interests of both
prudence and justice.” (French, supra, 72 La. L.Rev. at p. 485; see
Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary
Immunity (2010) 15 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 123, 152 [“A tort system that
imposes the costs on the person who engaged in the legal risk—the
anonymous commenter—is the fairest method of imposing
liability”].) Additionally, it is the “only way” to “encourage [a]
website to screen content fearlessly and fairly.” (French, at p. 485).
If interactive computer services instead removed all content upon
notice, studies have shown that “every actual defamatory message
that an intermediary is pressured to remove will result in between
four to nine other, non-defamatory postings also being censored.”
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(Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the
Online Marketplace of Ideas (2008) 63 U. Miami L.Rev. 137, 221.)
Because any damage to genuine defamation victims would have
already occurred after publication, “such a large false positive rate
is unacceptable.” (Ibid.; see Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 947, 956 [104 S.Ct. 2839, 81
L.Ed.2d 786] [“Even where a First Amendment challenge could be
brought by one actually engaged in protected activity, there is a
possibility that, rather than risk punishment for his conduct in
challenging the statute, he will refrain from engaging further in the
protected activity. Society as a whole then would be the loser.”].)
Most

importantly,

“[b]y

imposing

liability

on

the

intermediary, a court is harming society at large by reducing the
amount of speech on the Internet.” (Kosseff, supra, 15 J. Tech. L. &
Pol’y at p. 152.)

Imposing liability “would dramatically reduce

opportunities for free expression online,” and “many of the
platforms that have transformed everything from entertainment
and personal communications to democratic participation and social
activism might not exist at all.” (Law Professors Letter, supra, at p.
2.) Consequently, “there would be no online fora for Americans to
express themselves, thus eviscerating one of the most fundamental
rights in our country: the freedom of speech under the First
Amendment.” (Tischler, Free Speech Under Siege: Why the Vitality
of Modern Free Speech Hinges on the Survival of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (2014) 24 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts.
L.Rev. 277, 278-279.)
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D.

The Court of Appeal’s decision imperils many widely
used websites.
Section 230’s broad immunity has been particularly

influential on the development of websites such as “YouTube, eBay,
Yahoo!, Verizon, Comcast, and others.” (Lemley, Rationalizing
Internet Safe Harbors (2007) 6 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 101,
111.) Absent immunity, these websites would “face the prospect of
tens of billions of dollars in statutory damages for hosting, carrying,
or linking to content whose provenance they cannot determine” and
“either go out of business” or “impose restrictions on the content
they will carry sufficiently onerous that they would effectively lock
down the Internet.” (Ibid.) The Internet has flourished in part
because courts have consistently protected these entities from
crippling liability, but the Court of Appeal’s decision calls this body
of law into question, opening these influential websites to lawsuits
that could threaten their existence.
For instance, eBay hosts third-party reviews of sellers and
buyers, which opens up the bidding service to defamation claims. It
also suffers from false advertising claims based on sellers’ listing
descriptions. Cases such as Mazur v. eBay, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2009) 257
F.R.D. 563, and Gentry, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 816, have recognized
eBay is immune from such false advertising claims due to section
230. In particular, the Court of Appeal in Gentry reasoned that
lawsuits against eBay and other providers based on third-party
content would threaten freedom of speech and “ ‘the robust nature
of Internet communication.’ ” (Gentry, at p. 829, quoting Zeran,
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supra, 129 F.3d at p. 330.) Therefore, denying immunity would
become “ ‘an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” (Gentry, at p. 833.) The
decision below would frustrate the same congressional purposes.
Section 230 has also protected Google from liability. Google’s
“suggested” advertisements have not resulted in culpability due to
section 230’s broad protection. (Goddard v. Google, Inc. (N.D.Cal.
2009) 640 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1197, 1202.) Google’s “sponsored” links
have also been immunized against plaintiffs’ attempts to “plead
around” section 230 by claiming Google actually created user
content. (Jurin v. Google Inc. (E.D.Cal. 2010) 695 F.Supp.2d 1117,
1123.) Like Yelp’s reviews, Google’s organic search results have
also been protected from complaints targeting allegedly defamatory
third-party websites and Google’s decisions in removing or deindexing them. (Manchanda v. Google (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 16, 2016, No.
16-CV-3350 (JPO)) 2016 WL 6806250, at p. *3 [nonpub. opn.]
[immunizing Google under section 230].) However, the decision
below threatens these protections. Google “has no realistic way of
knowing which of the over 10 billion Web pages it searches” could be
defamatory “[e]ven if it employed an army of lawyers to scrutinize
all of the content.” (Lemley, supra, 6 J. Telecomm. & High Tech L.
at p. 102.)
Courts have also protected Facebook from liability for content
on user profiles. (Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2016) 167
F.Supp.3d 1056, 1066 [no responsibility for a third-party account
because

“[l]iability

based

on

that

sort

of

vicarious

responsibility . . . is exactly what § 230(c) seeks to avoid”].) When
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courts have rejected efforts to plead around immunity against
Facebook, they have emphasized that “ ‘what matters is whether
the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the
defendant as the “ ‘publisher or speaker’ ” of content provided by
another.’ ” (Sikhs for Justice “SFJ” Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D.Cal.
2015) 144 F.Supp.3d 1088, 1094, quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th
Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1101.) Thus, contrary to the Court of
Appeal’s reasoning below, it is irrelevant whether a lawsuit names a
particular website as a defendant, because ultimately the website is
treated as a publisher if its Internet speech is enjoined. Under such
a liability regime, Facebook could be subjected to “ ‘costly and
protracted legal battles’ ” (Sikhs, at p. 1096), and risk “ ‘shutting
down’ ” (Caraccioli, at p. 1065).
Amazon, the largest Internet retailer, has also avoided
crippling liability because of section 230. (Joseph v. Amazon.com,
Inc. (W.D.Wash. 2014) 46 F.Supp.3d 1095, 1106 [“The CDA’s
express terms preclude [Plaintiff] from treating Amazon as a
publisher”]; Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (W.D.Wash 2004) 351
F.Supp.2d 1090, 1117-1118.) Like Yelp, Amazon allows its users to
post reviews, which makes it a target for defamation actions. But
courts have “repeatedly barred similar claims against countless
websites that allow anonymous reviews or other allegedly
defamatory content to be posted by third parties,” and this case is
no different. (Joseph, at p. 1106.) If the decision below were
extended to Amazon, Amazon would have no incentive to selfregulate its customer reviews to find fake posts since it would be
easier and more cost-effective to simply remove messages upon any
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allegation of defamation.

(See Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc.

(Ct.App. 2001) 108 Wash.App. 454, 463 [“Congress intended to
encourage self-regulation, and immunity is the form of that
encouragement” (footnote omitted)].)
Likewise, the effect of imposing liability on Twitter would be
“untenable.” (Lee, Subverting the Communications Decency Act:
J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings (2016) 7 Cal. L.Rev. Circuit 11,
18.) Since takedown requests can “span [an] entire range of daily
tweets,” which can number 500 million, Twitter might instead
overregulate its users’ speech to avoid liability for such a
voluminous number of posts. (Ibid.)
Avvo, one of the preeminent websites for attorney ratings, has
also avoided liability for its rating system due to the prospect of
section 230 immunity. (King, Amicus Letter of Avvo, Inc. to Chief
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Associate Justices of the California
Supreme Court, Aug. 10, 2016, p. 1 [“The fact that none of these
cases have made it past the pleadings . . . is due in large measure to
what we call ‘the law that makes the internet go:’ 47 U.S.C. § 230”].)
Similarly, Avvo’s rating system has been protected by the First
Amendment. (Browne v. Avvo Inc. (W.D.Wash. 2007) 525 F.Supp.2d
1249, 1251-1253 [not reaching the issue of immunity under section
230 because plaintiffs disavowed all claims based on third-party
content].) However, the Court of Appeal’s decision threatens Avvo’s
success in this regard, introducing the possibility that courts will
not entertain section 230 immunity at all. Furthermore, “[i]n the
absence of this immunity, [Avvo] would likely need to have rigidly
open forums—to avoid allegations of abuse of some standard of
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care—or simply stop providing the public with a resource in which
people could read and post about experiences with legal
representation.” (Avvo Amicus Letter, at p. 2.)
Furthermore, section 230 protects smaller startups and
entities such as public libraries that integrate third-party content.
(See Kathleen R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 691-692 [protecting a
public library from liability for unrestricted access to the Internet].)
Without immunity, these smaller yet equally important entities are
even more likely to restrict user content in order to avoid liability
because of their limited financial resources to defend themselves in
litigation. (See Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.) The Court of
Appeal’s opinion, if affirmed, would have devastating consequences
for these smaller entities, at significant cost to the overall
marketplace of ideas.
By enforcing an injunction against Yelp, the Court of Appeal
inadequately considered the catastrophic impact on the Internet
that could result. It has treated Plaintiffs’ claim inconsistently from
all other judgment enforcement actions against interactive
computer services simply because Plaintiffs never named the
Internet provider as a defendant in the underlying defamation suit.
If affirmed, the Court of Appeal’s decision will undoubtedly “lead[ ]
to litigation abuses by plaintiffs who seek to recast claims subject to
significant immunity as different types of claims with lesser or
nonexistent immunity.” (Lemley, supra, 6 J. Telecomm. & High
Tech. L. at p. 108.) Plaintiffs dismiss these effects as a “sky-isfalling” argument (ABOM 46), but ignore the fact that the immunity
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they seek to override is precisely why the sky has not fallen and the
Internet has flourished.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the
decision below and direct the trial court to grant Yelp’s motion to
vacate the judgment.
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